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Suppose one wants to certify that a quantum channel is not entanglement-breaking. I consider all
four combinations of trusted and untrusted devices at the input and output of the channel, finding
that the most interesting is a trusted preparation device at the input and an untrusted measurement
device at the output. This provides a time-like analogue of EPR-steering, which turns out to reduce
to the problem of joint measurability, connecting these concepts in a different way to other recent
work. I suggest a few applications of this connection, such as a resource theory of incompatibility.
This perspective also sheds light on why the BB84 key distribution protocol can be secure even with
an untrusted measuring device, leading to an uncertainty relation for arbitrary pairs of ensembles.
The crucial distinction between separable and entan-
gled quantum states has its analogue in the notion of an
entanglement-breaking channel [1, 2]. An entanglement-
breaking channel C can be thought of as measuring a
POVM {Eλ} on the input system, transmitting the clas-
sical information λ, and then preparing an element of the
set of states {ρλ} on the output system, so that
C(ρ) =
∑
λ
Tr(Eλρ)ρλ. (1)
Verifying the entanglement of a quantum state with
various levels of trust is now a well-studied topic. In the
bipartite case, there are three main possibilities. Most
commonly both parties are trusted, allowing state to-
mography and/or the use of entanglement witnesses. In
the other extreme, neither party is trusted, so that one
must resort to testing Bell inequalities [3, 4]. The inter-
mediate case where one party is trusted is known as the
EPR-steering scenario [5], where one can test steering
inequalities [6].
Since a channel is entanglement-breaking if and only if
it gives a separable state when applied to half of a max-
imally entangled state, the problem of verifying that a
channel is not entanglement-breaking could be reduced to
the above possibilities. However that requires the ability
to prepare entangled states, and if any devices are un-
trusted it requires parties at space-like separation. Here
I focus on the situation where there are just two parties,
Alice who prepares quantum systems and inputs them
entirely into the channel, and Bob who performs mea-
surements solely on the output of the channel. Assuming
that the channel is realisable and non-trivial, Bob’s ac-
tions must be in the future of the Alice’s, ruling out the
possibility of space-like separation.
In this setup there are now four situations, one more
than in the bipartite entanglement case due to the lack
of Alice-Bob symmetry in the setup: untrusted Alice and
trusted Bob is fundamentally different from trusted Alice
and untrusted Bob. After a brief discussion of all four
cases, I will focus on trusted Alice and untrusted Bob.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, this bears a close resemblance
to the EPR-steering scenario. But it turns out to boil
down to the well-known problem of joint measurability
of POVMs. Steering and joint measurability have already
been found to be closely connected: lack of joint measur-
ability is necessary and sufficient for the measurements to
enable violations of steering inequalities [7, 8]. Here the
natural translation of the steering scenario from states to
channels reveals a connection that is perhaps even closer:
the translated concept of steering is lack of joint measur-
ability.
I outline a few translations enabled by this connec-
tion. For example, the resource theory of steering [9, 10]
is easily adapted into a resource theory of measurement
incompatibility. Building on [11], it also gives a more
transparent and general understanding of why the BB84
key distribution protocol [12] is secure with an untrusted
measuring device.
The basic idea of this paper is implicit in the recently
defined notion of “channel steering” [13], being the spe-
cial case when (in the notation of [13]) B’s output is triv-
ial, just like channel steering reduces to standard EPR-
steering when C’s input is trivial. Hence all of the results
of [13] apply here. Nevertheless I think this special case
is interesting enough to merit specific investigation, and
that this lends further support to the definition of chan-
nel steering chosen in [13].
I. THE FOUR SCENARIOS
The most familiar scenario is when both Alice and Bob
are trusted. Then Alice can use an informationally com-
plete set of preparations, and Bob an informationally
complete set of measurements, to together reconstruct
C. This is known as process tomography [14]. One can
then use standard tools from entanglement theory [15]
to check whether C is entanglement-breaking (or equiva-
lently [2], if the Choi isomorphic state [16] is separable).
Now consider the case that Alice has an untrusted
preparation device. She chooses a classical label x and
then the device inputs an unknown state ρ˜x into the
channel. Since Bob’s devices are still trusted he can
do state tomography to determine the resulting output
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2states ρx = C(ρ˜x). But whatever he sees could always
have come from the entanglement-breaking channel
C˜(ρ) =
∑
x
ρx 〈x|ρ|x〉 (2)
provided Alice’s device simply encodes x in the orthonor-
mal basis {|x〉}.
When compared to the standard steering scenario, the
key difference is that there is no way to rule out Alice’s
choice x from being transmitted to Bob, because the very
thing we are testing is a channel from Alice to Bob. (Note
that, by considering a more elaborate scenario, an anal-
ogy with steering can be obtained wherein an untrusted
party acts before a trusted one [17].)
If we extend our distrust of Alice to encompass Bob,
then we have strictly less information, namely just prob-
abilities p(b|x, y) = Tr(E˜b|yC(ρ˜x)) from inputting a set-
ting y and receiving an outcome b from Bob’s device that
implements unknown POVMs {E˜b|y}. Since we can sim-
ulate any C(ρ˜x) with an entanglement-breaking channel,
this can be extended to p(b|x, y). In fact it is trivial to
produce any p(b|x, y) whatsoever: Alice encodes x in the
{|x〉} basis, the channel is C˜(ρ) = ∑x |x〉 〈x| ρ |x〉 〈x|, and
Bob measures the POVM {∑x p(b|x, y) |x〉 〈x|}. (Again,
with more background assumptions, a “time-like” ana-
logue to Bell inequalities was obtained by Leggett and
Garg [18]. Similarly to the issue here of Alice’s setting
being sent to Bob, the Leggett-Garg scenario allows “sig-
nalling in time” [19] that weakens the analogy to the Bell
scenario.)
Last but not least, the final possibility is a trusted Alice
and an untrusted Bob. Using a informationally complete
set of preparations {ρx}, we can reconstruct the POVM
Eb|y = C†(E˜b|y) that Bob’s POVMs E˜b|y induces on the
input of C. If C is an entanglement-breaking channel then
its adjoint is, by eq. (1)
C†(E) =
∑
λ
Eλ Tr(Eρλ), (3)
so that
Eb|y =
∑
λ
Eλp(b|y, λ), (4)
where p(b|y, λ) = Tr(E˜b|yρλ). Conversely any Eb|y of
the form eq. (4) can be achieved by the entanglement-
breaking channel C˜(ρ) =
∑
λ Tr(Eλρ) |λ〉 〈λ| provided
Bob measures the POVM {∑λ p(b|y, λ) |λ〉 〈λ|}.
Readers familiar with the EPR-steering scenario [5, 9,
20] will notice the resemblance of eq. (4) to the basic
definition of a set of sub-normalized steered states {σb|y}
that are compatible with a separable state, known as an
“unsteerable assemblage”:
σb|y =
∑
λ
p(λ)σλp(b|y, λ), (5)
Alice Bob General data Classical data
Good Good Channel C C(·) =∑λ Tr(Eλ·)ρλ
Good Bad Induced POVMs {Eb|y} Eb|y =
∑
λEλp(b|y, λ)
Bad Good Output states {ρx} All (but see [17])
Bad Bad Probabilities {p(b|x, y)} All (but see [18])
TABLE I. Summary of the four possible combinations of
trusted (“good”) and untrusted (“bad”) devices at Alice’s in-
put and Bob’s output. The “general data” column lists what
can be determined in the scenario, with “classical data” being
the form compatible with an entanglement-breaking channel.
where the quantum states σλ are known as “local hidden
states”. Indeed if we absorb p(λ) into σ˜λ = p(λ)σλ then
we have
σb|y =
∑
λ
σ˜λp(b|y, λ), (6)
so that the only difference with eq. (4) is that∑
λ Tr(σ˜λ) = 1 whereas
∑
λEλ = I.
By analogy we might call {Eλ} a “local hidden POVM”
and the corresponding {Eb|y} unsteerable (the latter be-
ing somewhat counter-intuitive terminology since Bob
has to act after Alice). But in fact there is no need
for new terminology because eq. (4) is just the statement
that the {Eb|y} are jointly measurable (i.e. the fixed
POVM {Eλ} is sufficient to reproduce all of the measure-
ments using the classical post-processing {p(b|y, λ)}).
The four scenarios are summarised in table I. From
now on the focus will be a trusted Alice and untrusted
Bob. The discussion of this case above is summarised by
Theorem 1. A channel from a trusted Alice to an un-
trusted Bob can be shown not to be entanglement-breaking
if and only if the measurements Bob induces on the input
to the channel are not jointly measurable.
As noted in the introduction, this scenario is a special
case of channel steering [13], so that the above result is
a special case of [13]’s Proposition 1. Similarly, Theorem
8 of [13] specialises to
Theorem 2. A channel C allows Bob to induce incom-
patible measurements at Alice’s input if and only if the
corresponding Choi state ρAB allows Bob to steer Alice.
In other words, a trusted Alice and untrusted Bob can
certify that C is not entanglement-breaking in the present
“time-like” scenario if and only if they could certify that
ρAB is entangled in the standard “space-like” scenario.
II. SIMPLE TRANSLATIONS BETWEEN
EPR-STEERING AND JOINT MEASURABILITY
In the usual EPR-steering scenario an assemblage may
happen to satisfy
∑
b σb|y = I/d (i.e. Alice’s reduced
state is maximally mixed). In this case we can simply
3rescale the assemblage to a set of POVMs Eb|y = dσb|y.
Comparing eq. (4) with eq. (6) we see that {Eb|y} will
be jointly measurable if and only if {σb|y} is unsteerable.
This connection allows for the translation of some results
between scenarios, particularly existence results.
It was already noted in [8] that EPR-steering inequal-
ities and joint measurability inequalities are closely re-
lated. The scaling argument makes this particularly
transparent in the case of a linear EPR-steering inequal-
ity [6], which is a set of Hermitian operators Fb|y such
that ∑
b,y
Tr(Fb|yσb|y) ≤ L (7)
for all unsteerable assemblages {σb|y}. Since a jointly
measurable {Eb|y} is d times an unsteerable assemblage,
we must have ∑
b,y
Tr(Fb|yEb|y) ≤ dL (8)
for all jointly measurable {Eb|y}. Similarly, since an in-
compatible {Eb|y} is d times a steerable assemblage, and
all steerable assemblages violate a linear EPR-steering
inequality [6], all incompatible {Eb|y} will violate a lin-
ear joint measurability inequality obtained through this
translation.
For example, the simple steering inequality given as
Eq. (63) in [6] gives the joint measurability inequality
Tr
(
X(E1|1 − E2|1) + Y (E1|2 − E2|2)
) ≤ 2√2 (9)
for two binary qubit POVMs {Eb|1} and {Eb|2}, where
X and Y are Pauli matrices.
Perhaps the most important fact about EPR-steering
is that there are bipartite entangled states that never-
theless do not exhibit steering under projective measure-
ments. The classic example [5], based on a model by
Werner [21], involves maximally mixed reduced states.
Hence they can be translated into examples of non-
entanglement breaking channels where nevertheless pro-
jective measurements by Bob can only induce jointly
measurable POVMs on the channel input. The simplest
example would be the qubit channel
Cp(ρ) = pρ+ (1− p) I
2
. (10)
Translating [5, 21] we see Cp is entanglement-breaking
if and only if p ≤ 13 , whereas projective measurements on
the output induce jointly measurable POVMs on the in-
put whenever p ≤ 12 (and the non-entanglement-breaking
can be verified with untrusted Bob whenever p > 12 ).
Very recently [22] it was noticed that a model by Barrett
[23] can be adapted to show, in this scenario, that all
POVMs on the output induce jointly measurable POVMs
on the input whenever p ≤ 512 ≈ 0.41.
As an example in the opposite direction, consider
structures of joint measurability. Briefly, for a finite set
of measurements M = {M1, . . . ,Mn}, the joint measur-
ability structure is given by listing all of the (maximal)
subsets of M that are jointly measurable. The extreme
cases are {M}, meaning that all the measurements can
be measured together, and {{M1}, . . . , {Mn}}, meaning
that every pair of measurements is incompatible. A re-
cent result [24] states that any such structure can be
realised in (finite-dimensional) quantum theory. Trans-
lating (i.e. dividing everything by d), we see that the
corresponding structures of unsteerability in the EPR-
steering scenario are also as rich as possible. For example,
there is a three-settings assemblage that is steering even
though the sub-assemblage consisting of any pair of set-
tings is unsteerable - the EPR-steering equivalent of the
so-called Specker’s scenario [25, 26] in which three mea-
surements cannot all be jointly measured, even though
any pair of them can.
However, the scenarios are not isomorphic, and so not
every statement that is natural in one scenario will trans-
late to a statement that is natural in the other. For
example, any pair of two-outcomes measurements {Eb|y}
that are not jointly measurable can be used to violate the
CHSH [27] inequality by choosing an appropriate bipar-
tite state and pair of measurements {Ea|x} for the other
party [28]. In the EPR-steering scenario one might there-
fore wonder if any steerable two-setting two-outcome as-
semblage {σb|y} can be used to violate the CHSH in-
equality by choosing an appropriate {Ea|x} to form the
probabilities Tr(Ea|xσb|y), at least when
∑
b σb|y = I/d.
In fact a direct translation of [28] doesn’t establish this
because there is nothing to play the role of the bipar-
tite state (which in general does not have a maximally
mixed reduced state and is therefore not isomorphic to a
channel). An explicit example of a steerable two-setting
two-outcome qubit assemblage (with
∑
b σb|y = I/2) that
fails to violate the CHSH inequality is
σ1|1 = 0.3 |0〉 〈0| , (11)
σ2|1 = 0.2 |0〉 〈0|+ 0.5 |1〉 〈1| , (12)
σ1|2 = 0.3 |+〉 〈+| , (13)
σ2|2 = 0.2 |+〉 〈+|+ 0.5 |−〉 〈−| . (14)
Using semi-definite programming is easy to check that
this assemblage is steering and yet the optimum {Ea|x}
give a value for CHSH’s expression of approximately 1.7,
which satisfies the local upper bound of 2. Another way
of stating this fact is that “choosing an appropriate bi-
partite state” is essential to the result of [28], one cannot
simply use a maximally entangled state for any pair of
measurements.
III. THE RESOURCE THEORY OF
MEASUREMENT INCOMPATIBILITY
Most of our quantitative understanding of entangle-
ment [15] comes from thinking of it as a resource theory:
4allowing local operations and classical communication for
free, how ‘useful’ is a given multipartite quantum state
(the basic objects of the theory)? Recently, to under-
stand how best to quantify steering [9, 29], a similar “re-
source theory of steering” [10] has been developed.
In the resource theory of steering, the free operations
are local quantum operations by the trusted party, local
classical operations on the input and output of the un-
trusted party, and one-way classical communication from
the trusted to the untrusted party.
This translates naturally into a resource theory of mea-
surement incompatibility. The basic objects are sets of
POVMs {Eb|y}. The free operations, which might be
called compatibility non-decreasing operations (CNDO)
consist of prepending these POVMs with a fixed quan-
tum instrument {Ca}, classically processing the new in-
put y′ along with a into a new choice y from amongst
the original POVMs, and classically processing outcome
b, along with (a, y′, y), into a new output b′, as in fig. 1.
The requirement that the initial quantum instrument is
fixed (i.e. independent of y′), is equivalent to the restric-
tion that the untrusted party cannot send messages to
the trusted party in the resource theory of steering.
What are the “free resources” in this theory, analogous
to the separable states in entanglement theory? We will
now see that they are simply jointly measurable POVMs.
We can turn an arbitrary input set of POVMs {Eb|y} into
an arbitrary set of jointly measurable POVMs {Fb|y} by
prepending the joint measurement, feeding an arbitrary
state into {Eb|y} and ignoring the output, and then clas-
sically processing the output of the joint measurement
to obtain the appropriate output b for a given input y.
On the other hand, if we start with a jointly measur-
able POVM {Eb|y}, the CNDO can only give us another
jointly measurable POVM {Fb|y} because prepending the
joint measurement of {Eb|y} with the fixed quantum in-
strument gives us a joint measurement of {Fb|y}.
Incompatible POVMs are then a resource: for exam-
ple, for any such POVMs there exist entangled states
for which the POVMs would demonstrate EPR-steering
[7, 8]. In the scenario considered above, any incompatible
POVMs can be used by an untrusted party to show that
they are receiving a non-entanglement-breaking channel
from a trusted party, at least in the case of a unitary
channel (whose adjoints, which are also unitary chan-
nels, always map incompatible POVMs to incompatible
POVMs).
The main results of [10] translate into results about
measurement incompatibility. For example, in analogy
with the “steerable weight” we can define the “incom-
patible weight” of a set of POVMs {Eb|y} as the smallest
ν ≥ 0 such that
Eb|y = νFb|y + (1− ν)Gb|y (15)
for arbitrary POVMs {Fb|y} and jointly measurable
POVMs {Gb|y}. Evidently the incompatible weight is
zero if and only if the {Eb|y} are jointly measurable, and
an argument similar to Appendix D of [10] shows that
it is non-increasing under CNDO and can therefore be
called an “incompatibility monotone” [30].
As another example, in appendix A it is argued that
Theorem 4 of [10] gives
Theorem 3. Suppose {Eb|y} and {Fb|y} are both pairs of
distinct non-trivial two-outcome projective measurements
on a qubit. Then the first can be converted into the second
by CNDO if and only if it can be converted by simply
prepending a unitary. [32]
Compare the pair of measurements defined by the
eigenstates of X and Z with the pair defined by X and√
1− X + √Z for small  > 0. Since the second pair
would be jointy measurable for  = 0, one might think
that the first pair is “more incompatible” than the sec-
ond. But since the above theorem tells us that neither
pair can be converted to the other by CNDO, there not
only exists an incompatibility monotone that assigns a
higher value to the first than the second, but also an-
other monotone that does vice versa. [33]
IV. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
An entanglement-breaking channel as in eq. (1) can
trivially be extended to give additional parties the same
access to Alice’s input as Bob has, for example
C′(ρ) =
∑
λ
Tr(Eλρ)ρλ ⊗ ρλ. (16)
However, channels which are not entanglement-breaking
have limits on such extendibility, giving a channel ana-
logue to the monogamy of entanglement [15]. Hence a
necessary condition for the security of a “prepare and
measure” quantum key distribution protocol is that Al-
ice and Bob verify that the channel between them is not
entanglement-breaking.
From the analysis of section I we therefore see
that prepare-and-measure key distribution is impossible
with completely untrusted preparation devices (although
rather weak forms of trust can suffice [35]). But since the
non-entanglement-breaking property can be verified with
an untrusted measuring device, it is plausible that quan-
tum key distribution is possible in this scenario.
A. BB84
For example, the parties in the BB84 protocol [12]
are doing everything needed to verify a violation of the
joint measurability inequality eq. (9) (with Z in place
of Y ). And indeed security proofs for the BB84 proto-
col have been provided for this scenario [11, 36–43], with
the distrust of Bob’s devices emphasized particularly in
[11, 40, 41]. This type of scheme was dubbed “one-
sided device independent quantum key distribution” in
[41], and entanglement-based versions were shown to rest
upon EPR-steering.
5Eb|y
y b
7→CNDO Eb|yCa
p(y|a, y′) p(b′|b, a, y′, y)
y′ b′
FIG. 1. A compatibility non-decreasing operation (CNDO) transforms a set of POVMs {Eb|y} into a set {Fb′|y′} enclosed in
the grey box (cf. figure 1 of [10]). Inside the box there is a fixed quantum instrument {Ca} and classical conditional probability
distributions p(y|a, y′) and p(b′|b, a, y′, y). Solid lines carry quantum systems, dashed lines indicate classical information.
The analyses [11, 40, 41] are all based on considering
equivalent entanglement-based protocols, following [44].
A more direct approach, along the lines pursued in earlier
works [36–38] and more recently in [42, 43], may add con-
ceptual clarity, as well as enabling consideration of cases
where the average state prepared by Alice depends on
her choice of basis, which would violate the no-signalling
principle in the entanglement-based scenario but is per-
fectly possible in an experiment where the states are
prepared directly. (Although such cases can also be ad-
dressed using different entangled states for each of Alice’s
bases, as in, for example, [39].)
The analyses of [11] can fairly straightforwardly be
adapted to apply directly to the “prepare and mea-
sure scenario” we are considering. They are based on
“monogamy of entanglement games”, which are defined
by n POVMs {Ex|θ} for Alice. Bob and Charlie then
choose a state ρABC and POVMs {Fx|θ} and {Gx|θ} with
the aim of maximizing quantities such as
pwin =
1
n
∑
θ,x
Tr
(
(Ex|θ ⊗ Fx|θ ⊗Gx|θ)ρABC
)
. (17)
When considering key distribution, the eavesdropper
would choose ρABC and have full control of Charlie.
Translating to the present scenario, a game would be
defined by n ensembles {ρx|θ} for Alice. Bob and Charlie
would then choose a channel C from A toBC and POVMs
as before with the aim of maximizing quantities such as
pwin =
1
n
∑
θ,x
Tr
(
(Fx|θ ⊗Gx|θ)C(ρx|θ)
)
. (18)
For an intuitive idea of the connection between such a
game and key distribution, suppose a game is such that
pwin is bounded away from 1. Then if, whichever ba-
sis θ is announced by Alice, Bob’s POVM Fx|θ is able
to recover Alice’s bit x perfectly, it must be that Char-
lie’s POVM cannot also recover it perfectly. In other
words, the strength of the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s copy of x provide limits anybody else’s access to
x. The assumption that C is independent of θ must be
enforced by Alice keeping θ secret until Bob’s output sys-
tem is in his custody. Since the BB84 protocol is based
on Alice preparing random eigenstates of Z and X, it
will be related to the “BB84 game” ρ0|0 = |0〉 〈0| /2,
ρ1|0 = |1〉 〈1| /2, ρ0|1 = |+〉 〈+| /2, ρ1|1 = |−〉 〈−| /2.
With minor modifications, outlined in appendix B,
the main results of [11] can be translated to this type
of game. In particular, this should facilitate the study
of prepare-and-measure protocols that cannot be con-
verted into entanglement-based protocols because of the
no-signalling issue discussed above. It also provides
an interesting type of uncertainty relation. Fix some
pair of ensembles {ρx|0} and {ρx|1} on a d-dimensional
Hilbert space A. For a given channel C from A to BC,
we can define pguess(X|BΘ) to be the optimum prob-
ability of guessing x given TrC(C(ρx|θ)), averaged over
the uniformly random choice θ of ensemble. Similarly
pguess(X|CΘ) denotes the optimum probability of guess-
ing x given TrB(C(ρx|θ)). A result of [11] can then be
translated into the statement that for all C,
pguess(X|BΘ) + pguess(X|CΘ) ≤ d(m+
√
c), (19)
where the two ensembles {ρx|θ} are characterized by
c = maxx,z
∥∥∥√ρx|0√ρz|1∥∥∥2 and m = maxx,θ Tr(ρx|θ).
Note that rather than the usual two incompatible mea-
surements on some state, this uncertainty relation is
about two ensembles {ρx|0} and {ρx|1} on A being fed
into some channel to BC. Such uncertainty relations
have been considered before, for example Corollary 6
of [45], and [46]. However those works use an equiva-
lence to the usual measurement uncertainty scenario that
only works if
∑
x ρx|0 =
∑
x ρx|1. By contrast, [42] pro-
vided a similar type of uncertainty relation (called there a
“cloning bound”) without this limitation. Equation (19)
shares this feature.
6B. B92
Another interesting prepare-and-measure key distribu-
tion protocol was proposed by Bennett [47]. It is in some
sense “minimal” in that Alice chooses between prepar-
ing just two (without loss of generality, qubit) states
|ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, which can be arbitrary non-orthogonal
pure states. Bob is supposed to choose between mea-
suring either {E1|1, E2|1} = {I − |ψ2〉 〈ψ2| , |ψ2〉 〈ψ2|} or
{E1|2, E2|2} = {I− |ψ1〉 〈ψ1| , |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|}.
Suppose that Bob’s measuring devices are untrusted.
Let us examine what we can learn about the measure-
ments Eb|y he induces on Alice’s input. If we find that
for i 6= j, 〈ψj |E1|i|ψj〉 = 0, then E1|i ≤ I − |ψj〉 〈ψj |. If
this is all we verify then the eavesdropper may be unam-
biguously discriminating [48, 49] between the |ψi〉, and
then giving Bob’s measuring device classical instructions
to output 1 for the E1|i measurement if the eavesdropper
has determined that the state is not |ψi〉, and 2 oth-
erwise. This is similar to the standard attack on Ben-
nett’s protocol in the presence of losses, except that the
eavesdropper’s increased control over the measuring de-
vice means that in place of the losses the eavesdropper
can simply instruct Bob’s device to give result 2 for both
measurements.
However, if we further verify that 〈ψi|E1|i|ψi〉 = 1 −
|〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2 (a mild extension to the protocol in [47], which
suggests throwing away some of the data needed to esti-
mate this probability), then in fact Bob must be inducing
the correct measurements. Since these measurements are
incompatible, the parties have certified that the channel
is not entanglement-breaking and there is hope for the
protocol to be secure. A full security proof would of
course require moving beyond the i.i.d. assumptions im-
plicit in this discussion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When translating EPR-steerability from bipartite
states to channels the problem of joint measurability nat-
urally emerges. I have outlined a few applications of this
connection, in particular to define a resource theory of
measurement incompatibility, but since the literatures on
EPR-steering and joint measurability are both large there
are bound to be many more.
The security of BB84 with an untrusted measurement
device is clarified by this perspective, in particular the
definitions and results of [11] can be adapted to apply
directly to the prepare-and-measure scenario. This also
provides an uncertainty relation for ensembles. It may be
fruitful to see if more powerful measurement uncertainty
relations, such as those of [40], can also be adapted to
arbitrary pairs of ensembles. Finally, it would be in-
teresting to further investigate whether the conceptually
important B92 protocol can also be secure with an un-
trusted measurement device.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3
The “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direc-
tion, direction, suppose {Eb|y} can be converted into
{Fb|y} by CNDO. That is, there exists a quantum in-
strument {Ca} and probability distributions {p(y|y′, a)},
{p(b′|b, a, y′, y)} such that
Fb′|y′ =
∑
a,y,b
C†a(Eb|y)p(y|y′, a)p(b′|b, a, y′, y) (A1)
Since {Fb′|y′} and {Eb|y} are rank-one projectors, they
can also be viewed as normalised quantum states. Hence
the only difference between eq. (A1) and the correspond-
ing EPR-steering problem is that
∑
a C†a is not necessarily
trace-preserving (but must be unital). However, the only
properties of the corresponding maps used in the proof in
Appendix D of [10] is complete positivity (in the form of
the existence of a Kraus decomposition) and so the proof
applies here as well.
Appendix B: Translation guide for [11]
Recall that we are interested in translating analyses
from the form of eq. (17) to the form of eq. (18). We
can bridge the gap somewhat by using the positive op-
erator ρABC Choi isomorphic to C, so that C(ρx|θ) =
TrA(ρABCρ
T
x|θ). Then (18) becomes
pwin =
1
n
∑
θ,x
Tr
(
(ρTx|θ ⊗ Fx|θ ⊗Gx|θ)ρABC)
)
. (B1)
which looks more like eq. (17). The two main differences
to keep in mind are that
∑
x ρ
T
x|θ is some unit trace op-
erator, which may depend on θ, rather than I, and ρABC
has trace d (the dimension of Alice’s Hilbert space) rather
than trace 1.
With one exception, we can ignore the requirement
on Choi states that TrBC(ρABC) = I because state-
ments about all ρABC will in particular be true about
ones satisfying the constraint. It would be interesting to
study whether using this constraint could lead to tighter
bounds.
In [11] frequent use is made of the “purification” of Bob
and Charlie’s strategy. In our scenario that corresponds
to dilating C into an isometry (giving the extra system
to say, Charlie, who ignores it) and then purifying Bob
and Charlie’s measurements as before.
I will now outline the results of these techniques on the
statements and proofs of the main theorems in [11].
8The statement of theorem 3 of [11], giving the op-
timum winning probability for the “BB84 game”, sur-
vives unscathed, except that the game is rescaled as
ρx|θ = ρTx|θ = F
θ
x/2
n. The strategy used to show that
the probability can be achieved does not translate into
a valid channel (this is the “one exception” mentioned
above). For n = 1 consider instead the channel that
measures {|φ〉 〈φ| , I − |φ〉 〈φ|} and broadcasts the result
0 or 1 to Bob and Charlie to use as their guesses. It is
easy to see that this gives the same probability of success
and for n > 1 it can be repeated n times. The proof of
optimality is essentially unchanged, in Eq. (7) of [11] we
pick up a factor of 2n from the larger trace of ρABC but
it cancels with the rescaling of ρx|θ.
Theorem 4 of [11], which bounds the winning proba-
bility of arbitrary games, can be converted into
pwin(G
×n;Q) ≤ |Q| dn
(
m(G)
|Θ| +
|Θ| − 1
|Θ|
√
c(G)
)n
,
(B2)
where in addition to the usual maximal overlap
c(G) = max
θ,θ′∈Θ
θ 6=θ′
max
x,x′∈X
∥∥√ρx|θ√ρx′|θ′∥∥2 , (B3)
we need the maximal probability
m(G) = max
θ∈Θ
max
x∈X
Tr(ρx|θ). (B4)
The factor of dn comes from the trace of ρABC . In
the proof’s definition of A and B we can multiply IT c
by m(G)|T
c| = m(G)n−t and still have B ≥ Aθq and
C ≥ Aθ′q as required. This factor carries through to∥∥∥√B√C∥∥∥ ≤ m(G)n−t(√c(G))t and ultimately into (B2).
The transposes on ρx|θ affect neither the norms nor traces
in eqs. (B3) and (B4) respectively.
Theorem 5 of [11], which concerns the security of an
entangled-based variant of BB84 with an arbitrary mea-
surement device for Bob, translates into a statement of
the security of the original BB84 protocol with an arbi-
trary measurement device. The state ρΘTXY E is defined
by Alice choosing a uniformly random θ and preparing
the n-qubit BB84 ensembles ρx|θ = |xθ〉 〈xθ| /2n with a
classical record of the θ and x stored in Alice’s registers Θ
and X, inputting the n qubits into an unknown channel
to Bob and Eve, and then Alice announcing θ to Bob so
that he can perform the corresponding unknown POVM
{Px|θ} and store the result in Y . Since m(G×nBB84) = 2−n,
eq. (B2) gives pwin(G
×n
BB84,Qnγ+,0) ≤ βn exactly as in
[11]. The remainder of the proof is unaltered.
Finally, Theorem 8 of [11], which provides an uncer-
tainty relation, becomes a statement about
ρXBCΘ =
∑
x,θ
1
2
|x〉 〈x|X ⊗ C(ρx|θ)⊗ |θ〉 〈θ|Θ (B5)
for a channel C from A to BC and a pair of ensembles
{ρx|0} and {ρx|1} on the d-dimensional system A. The
statement is that
pguess(X|BΘ) + pguess(X|CΘ) ≤ d(m+
√
c), (B6)
and
Hmin(X|BΘ) +Hmin(X|CΘ) ≥ −2 log
(
d
m+
√
c
2
)
,
(B7)
where c = maxx,z
∥∥∥√ρx|0√ρz|1∥∥∥2 and m =
maxx,θ Tr(ρx|θ). The d is from the normalization
of the Choi state ρABC , and the m is from strengthening∥∥Aθi ∥∥ ≤ 1 to ∥∥Aθi ∥∥ ≤ m.
